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Introduction:
The family business is the simplest, easiest and oldest business form in India. A family
business may be company, partnership firm or any other form of business owned,
controlled and operated by members of family. In India, by virtue of law, businesses or
properties may be held in the name of Hindu Undivided Family (HUF). HUF is assessed
for income tax purpose as a separate person under Section 2(31) (ii) of the Income Tax
Act 1961. Many companies that are now widely held company were once upon a time
founded as family business either as proprietary concern, HUF or partnership. HUF is not
required to be registered with any authority and is the result of birth and marriage of co-
parcner in a family. HUF may be a partner in a partnership firm or member/shareholder
in a company.
Family businesses are the major form of enterprise in India and across the world, viz.
Corporation houses like Suzlon, Tata, Birla, Bajaj, Reliance, Ford Motor, Tetra Pak, Wal-
Mart, DuPont, Cadbury, Acer Computers were started as family business. Several studies
indicate that family business carry the weight of economic wealth creation in all
economies. As per prudent estimates, the proportions of all worldwide business
enterprises that are owned or managed by families are in range of 65 to 80% (Gersick,
Davis, Hampton, & Lansberg). It is estimated that 40% of the Fortune 500 are family
owned or controlled (Gersick et al, 1997). Large family businesses play a major role in
OECD economies. Family-run businesses account for more than 85% of all firms in
OECD countries (2006). Moreover, family businesses dominate many developing
economies as well as figure prominently in certain developed economies. Sir Cadbury
(2000) has also concluded that family businesses are one of the foundations of the world's
business community.
In U.S.A., family business accounts for 80 to 90% of the 18 million business enterprises
and contribute 50% of the employment. In Canada, 80% of the companies listed on the
Toronto Stock Exchange are closely held in family trusts (Phan, Butler, & Lee, 2005). In
Europe, family firms dominate the small and medium size firms and are the majority of
larger firms in some countries (Gersick et al, 1997).
In Singapore and Hong Kong, the numbers are similar as many of the local business
enterprises that have recently gone public were started by overseas Chinese entrepreneurs
in the post-war period 40 years ago. In Taiwan the small and medium-sized family
enterprise accounts for more than 98.5% of companies, 80% of employment and 47% of
the total economy (Phan et al, 2005).
Bin Saleh (2006) estimates that family businesses employ between 50-60% of those who
works in companies around the world. In the Gulf area, family businesses represent 95%
of companies and in the Arab region; they form about 70% of the size of the economy.
He estimates that the local investments of 20 thousand family businesses in the gulf area
alone exceed $500 billion while their total international investments worth over $2
Trillion. These companies constitute 75% of the non-governmental sector in the Gulf area
employing around 15 million employees. Mahayny (2007) has estimated that family
businesses represent at least 55% of the GNP of any Arab country, 95% of all listed
companies in the region and employ 70% of the jobs outside the government and public
sector in the region.
During 1970, 93% of privately owned companies were family businesses in India
(Bhattacharyya, 2004). As per CII study (2001), 75% employment, 65% of GDP and
71% market capitalization in India is contributed by family business. The study reveals
that only 38% family business in India survives after 1st generation, 12% after second
generation and only 3% after 3rd generation. Of those that do last, 88% either disintegrate
or completely vanish before the fourth generation takes the reins. Among top 20
companies in terms of governance structure and value creation, 10 companies controlled
are by family business group. Governance practices of Indian business houses changed
after 1991 liberalization. Prima facie analysis of Indian corporate governance practices
and rules differ for public sector, private sector, closely held and widely held companies.
Family-based business houses have grown in number & size in last two decades. More
than 35 percent of first 100 business houses are owned by families. Corporate
Governance norms are set for listed companies. It is voluntary for public sector while
there are no specific guidelines if a business does not fall in either of the category,
irrespective of its size and volume of the business.
Corporate Governance norms are applicable to only listed companies in India; however,
nearly 40% family-owned businesses surveyed by Grant Thornton International felt these
guidelines will impact their businesses. The Grant Thornton International Business
Owners’ Survey (IBOS) in India was conducted among 504 mid-sized family-owned
businesses employing 50 to 500 employees. Following results emerged out of the study:
Actions on governance India % Global %
Have already tightened up internal controls as a safeguard 66 71
Have already appointed non-executive or independent directors
on their boards and introduced formal policies on directors’ pay
25 28
Have formed an audit committee 46 34
Plan to put tighter internal controls 14 17
Plan to form an audit committee 12 13
Appointing non-executive directors 8 11
As per Grant Thornton International’s Mr. Chandiok, the reasons for the pro-active
response to corporate governance by Indian family businesses could be two-fold (i) they
feel they would be covered by the guidelines in the near future and (ii) putting
international best practices in place would give them a good standing in the current
competitive marketplace and differentiate them in dealing with overseas associates or
partners.
This paper examines corporate governance issues in selected family based business
houses in India, spanning theoretical background & current practice of corporate
governance in family businesses; the concepts, importance, pros and cons, barriers and
governance tactics, and the reasons of applying corporate governance norms in family
business, shareholding pattern, the ways and methodology used for applying corporate
governance, the key challenges and problems they face, and the results of such changes.
This research may help to design special policy measures for companies managed by
family. It is concluded that corporate governance is important for appropriate
synchronization between the business & family and to become adaptive so as to take
positive changes, large number of business houses are using HUF shareholding pattern as
mode of succession planning, tax planning tool, division of share and maintaining Indian
ethos.
Research Objectives & Methodology
We have selected seven prominent family business houses for the study. We study
corporate governance practice of selected companies namely, (1) Nirma Limited which is
headed by first generation entrepreneur K. K. Patel. (2) Cadila Healthcare, which is
headed by Pankaj R. Patel, a second generation entrepreneur, his father Ramanbhai Patel
was one of the founders who adopted a policy of steady growth through the organic
route; Pankaj Patel has accelerated growth through acquisitions. After buying a pharma
company in France, he is scouting for more acquisitions in Europe & Latin America. (3)
Torrent Pharmaceuticals is headed by Sudhir Mehta, who added up six group companies.
Mehta's father, UN Mehta, established the Torrent group through the pharmaceutical
venture. Later, the group took control of Ahmedabad Electricity Company and Surat
Electricity Company from the state government and emerged as a major player in the
power sector. (4) The Lalbhais of Arvind group is into textile and the group enjoys
distinction of surviving after 3 generations. (5) Top exporter and port developer Gautam
Adani heads Adani Enterprise dealing into energy, port, food & education. (6) Suzlon
Energy Limited is headed by Tulsi Tanti and global leader amongst energy enterprises.
(7) Nandan Exim Limited is controlled by Chripal family, headed by Ved Prakash
Chiripal, a self developed businessman, who ventured with a small textile business in
1972, now into petrochemicals, export, infrastructure, retail & education.
It is far-sighted to explain “family business” rather than defining it. A family business is
the companies that are owned or controlled and managed by the families. A family
business refers to a company where the voting majority is in the hands of the controlling
family; including the founder/s who intend to pass the business to their descendants
(Abouzaid, 2007). As per Companies Act 1956, shareholders’ general meeting elects the
board members by simple majority amongst who are present in the shareholders’
meeting. Hence, it is possible that, even holding less than 50% may empower promoters
to elect board members of their choice. In our study, Arvind Mills and Nandan Exims
have less than 50% voting rights, but are controlling company by electing board members
of their choice. Rest of the companies is having more than 50% controlling shares with
the promoters. Friedman defines a family business as a company that is either owned or
controlled by one family (Friedman, 1998). Another study says that the founder family
continues to have significant influence in the company, disproportionate to shareholding
(Lubrano, 2005). Hunt & Handler define a family business as the business that is owned
and managed by one or more family members (Hunt & Hamdler, 1999). In essence, as
per various definitions of family business is a company controlled by a family, either
through ownership, voting power, management or mix of those. It is founded by family
members and influenced by the family and such business is intended to be passed on to
future family generations on continuing basis. The family business is a unique business
organization that integrates a business system with a fundamentally different family
system. Family business is a system which is organized to achieve specific goals, driven
by tasks, may or may not be characterized by competitiveness. Following inclusive list
envisage possible combinations of a family business form in India, Table A depicts
shareholding pattern of the selected companies:
1. Head of the family runs business in his name and hold property as trust
2. HUF
3. Partnership firm, controlling interest may be in name of family members
4. Partnership firm, where one of the partner may be HUF
5. Partnership firm, partner may be family trust or minor added as beneficiary
6. Company, majority members/ controlling directors are family members
7. Company, where HUF may be one of the shareholder
8. Company, where family trust may be a shareholder
9. Company, where HUF and family trust are shareholders
10. Company, where one/more of the shareholder is private company
Table A
Shareholding Pattern of Promoters
Shareholder
Type
Individual
HUF
Body Corporate Any other
Company No. %
Share
Pledged
%
No. %
Share
Pledged
%
No. %
Share
Pledged
%
Nirma
Limited
8 25.59 0 5 12.57 0 9 39.01 0
Cadila
Pharma
10 0.01 0 - - 0 1 74.78 0
Torrent
Pharma
2 2.24 0 1 50.89 0 0 0 0
Adani
Enterprise
5 0.18 0 2 12.18 0 9 61.83 14.83
Arvind Mills 22 0.14 69.32 19 38.62 52.16 0 0 0
Suzlon
Energy
20 43.61 78.81 6 9.47 29.54 0 0 0
Nandan Exim 16 42.67 76.01 3 7.00 69.74 0 0 0
Family businesses prefer members as employee on the key post. Many family businesses
have non-family members as employees particularly in medium & bigger enterprises.
When only a few family members share decision-making authority, a company can be
aggressive in the marketplace and quickly respond to changes in the business
environment. Generally strategic posts & financial powers are vested in family members
& relatives. Family business gets capital from the founder, family members and their
relatives because of personal bond with each other. Family businesses are usually
reluctant to apply corporate governance as it means reducing the family power and
control over the business. The finance literature widely discusses the effect of family
control on the firm’s operation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the firm value (Fama and
Jensen, 1985) and capital structure (Randy and Goel, 2000; Vries de, 1993; Leland and
Toft, 1986). The terms “promoter family control”, “founding family control”, “ownership
control”, “ownership concentration” and “management control” are used interchangeably
in literature. However, McConnaughy et al. (2001) have described the nuances between
these terms. Anderson and Reeb (2003) clarified that “the family represents a unique
class of shareholders with poorly diversified portfolios, who are long term investors
(multiple generations), and often control senior management positions”. Hence, family
firms are those in which the founder and his or her relatives have a majority stake in
managing and controlling the affairs of the firm.
Evidence shows that the level of equity held by the firm’s management does influence the
firm’s efficiency, profitability and capital structure and therefore its value (McConaughy
et.al., 2001). The study by Morck, Shelfier and Vishny (1988) found that the firm value
(as measured by Tobin’s Q) increased when the promoter family held top position in the
firm. James (1999) argued that family traits such as altruism, paternalism would
encourage an atmosphere of love and commitment towards the business. Fama and
Jensen (1983) argued that the long-term nature of the family relationship is meritorious in
monitoring and disciplining the managers. La Porta et al (1996) documented that many
large organizations tried to adopt these family traits in an effort to compete more
effectively and boost firm performance. Further, the family influence is yet another
corporate governance mechanism as it involves replacing the other monitory mechanism
(direct monitoring by appointed executives to run the firm). Therefore the family
leadership enables the owners of the firm to exercise full control over the corporate
insiders (paid executive directors of the board) and the overall management (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). This frees the family controlled firms from
incurring a huge agency cost and can therefore benefit the promoters enormously.
Further, this ensures a lot of involvement from the promoter of the firm ultimately
leading to the fullest utilization of the resources and other capabilities of promoter. This
results in better firm performance for investors. There is enough evidence in the literature
(Kang, 1998; Morck et al., 1988; McConaughy et al., 1998) suggesting that family
controlled firms exhibit better performance in comparison to firms in which family
control is insignificant. The success of business also depends upon possession of
necessary technical skill by promoters. Our investigation shows that, Cadila was founded
by pharmacists and succeeded by second generation technocrats. Founder promoter of
Suzlon is an engineer. The founder or promoters of the companies are
commerce/management graduates and all promoters have fair amount of business
exposure through the family business.
However in family controlled firms, threatening factors such as family instability, lack of
succession planning, etc. may negatively influence the firm value (Demstez, 1983;
Demstez and Lehn, 1985). Family-owned companies are characterized as organizations in
which the shareholders belong to the same family and participate substantially in the
management, direction, and operation of the company. It is widely recognized that each
family has its own unique unwritten rules, values, histories, and communication methods.
As the family structure shrinks or expands, the company changes, particularly with the
advent of the second and third generations. Changes instigated by new generations can
improve or harm the business.
Families have a number of unique attributes that serve to strengthen a family business,
including love, care, unconditional acceptance, generational hierarchy, emotion,
informality, closeness, loyalty, commitment, stability, relationships, growth and
development, safety, support, and tradition. Families can also have a number of negative
traits such as anger, tension, confusion, competitiveness, and strangled communication,
which can affect a company to the detriment of all. These qualities are reflected into
business ownership methods and styles, and can support or harm a company. Good
governance mechanisms can alleviate some of the problems that arise when family
characteristics become a driving force behind company action. Despite having a close
network of owner/directors and the ability to make decisions quickly, family-owned
companies may unable to sustain growth and have a shorter lifecycle than a privately
owned company due to is inherent disadvantages attached. Following are the pros & cons
of a family business.
Family Business: Pros & Cons
The milieu Pros Cons
Family relation Mutual trust & respect amongst
family members, Employees
committed; loyal; shared values
and belief system; family spirit;
family name; family dream; strong
sense of mission/vision. Family,
extended family and relatives have
a very strong sense of loyalty to
the family that automatically
translates as loyalty to the
business.
Can't keep family issues out
of business; inability to
balance family's and
business's need for liquidity;
lack of objectivity; inward
looking; emotionally charged
decision-making; can't
separate work and family;
rivalries
Culture Informal; flexible; adaptable;
common language; efficient
communications
May restrict innovation;
highly emotional; resistant to
change; reactive; high risk for
conflicts
Family Role:
Entrepreneurship
Often play multiple roles; flexible;
dual relationships; quick decision
Role confusion; nepotism
overrule competency; dual
Oversight, Catalyst
Leadership
Symbiotic
making roles interfere with learning
and objectivity; no
organization charts
Leadership Entrepreneurial, ambitious;
informal authority;
Autocratic; resistant to
structure and systems
Survival
The single minded dedication of
the CEO and the family ensures
that family-owned business
survives through the toughest
times
If head of the family become
incapacitated due to death or
any other reason and no
successor is ready to continue
business, business may close
Time
Long-term perspective; committed;
patient capital; loyalty; deeper ties;
trust built up over time
Hard to change; tradition
bound; history of family
affects business decisions;
trust affected by early
disappointments
Complexity
Can foster creativity; rich interplay
of roles and goals
Must be managed to avoid
confusion; can be a drain of
resources and energy
Governance
Closely held; family owned; high
degree of control; earnings are
motivators
May sacrifice growth for
control; do not have to answer
to stockholders; often no
Clearly defined culture leads
smooth governance
Autocracy and paternalism
lacks democracy
Fewer principal-agent problems Messy organization structure
Succession
Training can begin early;
mentoring a life-long process; can
choose when to leave
Family issues get in way;
unwillingness to let go;
inability to choose a successor
Continuity in leadership thereby
encouraging long-term orientation
May have to depend on even
weak leader
Infrastructure
Informal; flexible; entrepreneurial;
innovative
Unclear; confusing; boundary
problems; indecisive; resistant
to change; lack of
management development
Capital Committed, sacrifice return for
time being
Limited resource pool
Authority Greater independence Placing personal or family
interest first
Decision process
Co-ownership within the family
leading to better investment
strategies
Family problem affect
business decisions
Quick decisions Problems with succession
planning
Flexibility Nepotism and favoritism
Long-term family involvement
without formal remuneration
Costly & complex inter-
generational transfers
Effective monitoring and Family instability due to
Management cost disciplining of managers, Low
monitoring cost
conflict among the family
members for control
Business skill Family members’ extensive
knowledge of the firm
Limited technical knowledge
General
Good governance directly
addresses the above issues for
family-owned companies by
Integrating the strengths of family
and business.
Improving shareholder
relationships through effective
communication and conflict
management
Systemizing wealth distribution
mechanisms.
Supporting growth and business
diversification.
Managing ownership and
leadership transitions.
Developing the next generation of
managers, shareholders, and family
members.
Improving credibility.
Attracting lower-cost debt and
equity capital.
Clear lines of succession do
not exist or are complicated
by the importance of family
relationships.
Loose organizational
structures do not attract and
retain quality human
resources.
Personal interest in the
success of the business leads
to an unwillingness to take
risks like expanding and
diversifying into new
business ventures.
Family’s reputation attract
investors to invest
Commitment to family values &
beliefs
Emotional attachment
Capable members are appointed as
professionals
Gap of skill, knowledge,
experience, expertise, licensing etc.
is filled by outsiders
Lack of motivation for
professional managers.
Professional management is
sub-servient to family‘s
interest.
Family governance determine
corporate governance.
Absence of succession plan.
Induction of younger member
without competence.
Features:
Owner defines the value of the company
The value of company reflects family value
Business group and not company decision makers
Relation in family business builds on trust between managers & owners and BoD and
owners
Owner prefer to appoint kith and kin as manager if talent is available internally
Owner appoints directors from friends & philosophers
Family’s unity and commitment have priority over objective of company, wealth
maximization of shareholders
Entrenchment of management is more in family business
Reasons of decay: split in family, internal management problem, absence of succession
plan, inability to face challenges of younger companies
Family charter: constitution of family, values & beliefs, code of conduct for family
members, document that provides bondage, and direction for behaviour, define role
Family council: all major members of the family, meeting frequently for critical decisions
Even studies based on the integrative models encompassing board involvement,
incorporating different theoretical perspectives and various board attributes such as board
size, board composition and number of non-executive directors on the board, provide
inconclusive results suggesting that corporate governance has, at least an indirect effect
on the company performance (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).
The factors considered for measuring corporate governance have been identified and
adopted differently by different researchers. For example Mishra et al. (2001) have used
variables such as firm age, board size, outside directors on the board and multiple classes
of shares. Few others (Millstein and MacAvoy, 1998; Bhagat and Black, 1999) have
taken board characteristics while others (Karpoff et al., 1996; Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000)
have considered “shareholder activism” as corporate governance. Further, the numerous
indexes for measuring corporate governance developed by researchers (Mohanty, 2001;
Black et al., 2003) have made the domain of corporate governance wider. However, most
of these studies were conducted in developed countries that have evolved corporate
governance to a larger extent (Black, 2001). Evidence also indicates that corporate
governance practices are likely to have a larger effect on the firm value in those
economies that are in the transition stage.
There are numerous factors that make family businesses governance needs unique. The
first of these factors is ownership. Public companies are typically owned by a large
number of shareholders whose primary interest in ownership is economic. However
family businesses are often owned by a much smaller group whose ownership often has
elements of personal identity, family legacy, and community responsibility intertwined
with economic interests. This “emotional ownership” often results in family businesses
having a longer-term view. Management of a public company is focused on the next
quarter’s results and the impact they will have on the share price, whereas a family
business can focus on what is best for the business and the family in the long run,
knowing that it is extremely unlikely that any of the family will want to sell their shares if
the business has an off quarter.
Another factor that tends to separate successful family firms from their public
counterparts is the concept of stewardship. Many family businesses have a clear
understanding that the business is something to be preserved and grown for future
generations. As Bill Ford, the chairman of Ford Motor Company once said, “I’m working
for my children and grandchildren and feel I’m working for our employees’ children and
grandchildren as well.” This longer-term focus and emphasis on stewardship often results
in family businesses outperforming publicly owned businesses in terms of profitability
and innovation. As summarized in MSN Money, July 28, 2004, Professors David Reeb
and Ronald Anderson have identified that, “Whether your yardstick is some accounting
measure like return on assets or stock-price performance, family run companies
outperform the rest by anywhere from 6 per cent to 13 per cent. On average, across all
measures, they beat other companies by 10 per cent.” Key to effective governance for a
family business is recognizing when the family business is moving from one stage to
another and designing revisions to the governance structure that will meet its needs for
the next stage.
According to Friedman, after 1970 only business researchers and scholars realized that
family businesses represent indeed a distinct system (Friedman, 1998). A family system
is bound and motivated largely by traditional responsibilities and loyalties; characterized
by unity. James Lea explains that meshing one system with the other inevitable means
that many of the family's biases, quirks, and internal relationships will bleed through into
the business's operating style, decision making, and future prospects (James Lea, 1991).
The literature on family businesses agrees that most family firms go through an evolution
process of ownership and management over time that is made of three key stages:
1st Generation
Controlled by Founder
This is the initial step
of the family business
existence. The
business is entirely
owned and managed
by the founder(s). It is
estimated that 75% of
all family businesses
are owned by one
person or couple at
this stage. Other
shares, if exist, are
also owned by family
members. Founders
own and work in the
business. Board of
Directors is generally
inactive and decisions
rest with a small
group. This is often
the stage where family
values are engrained
in the business and the
responsibilities of
ownership are imbued
in the next generation.
2nd Generation
Sibling Partnership
This is the stage where
management and
ownership have been
transferred to the
children of the
founder/s. As more
family members are
now involved in the
company, governance
issues tend to become
relatively complex.
Some family
shareholders may not
be working in the
business. Board
of Directors may be
active with help of
advisers & Family
Council. The leader
has to balance the
needs of the business
with the needs of
several families, not
all of whom get their
livelihood from the
business.
3rd Generation
Cousin Confederation
At this stage, the
business‟ governance
becomes more complex
as more family members
are directly or indirectly
involved in the business,
including children of the
siblings, cousins, and in-
laws. Since many of
these members belong to
different generations
and different branches
of the family, they might
have diverse ideas on
how the company
should run and how the
overall strategy should
be set. BoD may be
active and governance
issues may be more
formalized. Society may
view at this stage non-
family business.
Evolution stage in family business
Keys to Success:
 A clear structure separating governance of the firm and affairs of the family
 An effective board with competent & independent directors
 Logical structure of the firm with clear chain of command and decision-making
process
 Written recruitment, promotion and compensation policies
Critical issue in governance of family business:
 Distribution of roles & responsibilities Process of taking key decision
 Access to Capital Wealth & Power Diversification
 Any important family matters/business Accounting quality
 Reliability Charter of family value & vision
 Transparency Effective governing board
 Appropriation of profit Communication
 Value creation Fair policies and actions
 Succession Planning Election of family council members
 Approval of change in family values/vision Selection of head
 Approval of family employment Approval of compensation policies
Family Business in India
Many families have made significant contribution to Indian economy. Until the
government of India took socialist stand on investment the family-owned businesses in
India were successful and Tata Airlines was among the top 10 Airlines in the World. The
economy of the country was gauged for several years on the basis of the growth and
development of the family business. These businesses faced lot of problems and rendered
it quite unfit for global standards. With the opening of the economy in 1991 and the
influx of multinationals the family-owned businesses and the private sector was at a great
loss and on a back foot. It was felt that the family-owned business and family-owned
business houses would lose their place in the industrial map of the country. Time has
proved this to be wrong because the family-owned businesses have proved to be very
strong in their determination to carry the business on.
Even among large companies, shareholdings remain relatively concentrated with
“promoters” and family business groups continuing to dominate the corporate sector.
There is significant pyramiding and tunneling among Indian business groups and,
notwithstanding abundant reporting requirements, evidence of earnings management.
This is not surprising: concentrated ownership and family control are important in
countries where enforceable legal protection of minority property rights is relatively
weak. Family controlled businesses provide an organizational form that reduces
transaction costs and asymmetric information problems under these conditions.
(Corporate Governance in India, CFR Working paper)
Ownership Patterns
Family-run business groups clearly play a crucial role in the Indian corporate sector.
About 60% of these companies (comprising about 65% of the total market capitalization
of the Exchange), are part of these business groups. Recent studies have documented
significant tunneling of funds among business groups. The actual ownership within these
companies is far from being completely transparent with widespread pyramiding,
crossholding, and the use of non-public trusts and private companies for owning shares in
group companies. About 11% of companies comprising about 22% of the market
capitalization are companies wholly or significantly owned by the Central or State
Governments; about 20% of companies comprising about 8% of the market capitalization
are non-Group companies controlled by Indian promoters; and about 9% of companies
comprising about 5% of the market capitalization are non-Group companies controlled by
foreign promoters. It is evident from our study that all seven companies under study has
typical shareholding pattern. Nirma Limited has 51.58% shareholding with promoters’
HUF, family trusts and private companies. Cadila Healthcare Limited has 74.78% with
family trust, balance with HUFs and others. Torrent Laboratories has 50.89% held by
private limited company controlled by family and 20.62% with family members.
Shareholding patterns in India reveal significant concentration in the hands of the
promoters. Jayati and Subrata Sankar (2002) find that promoters held 47.74% of the
shares in a sample of almost 2500 listed manufacturing companies, and held 50.78% of
the shares of group companies and 45.94% of stand-alone firms. As for the impact of
concentrated shareholding on firm performance, an earlier study by these authors finds
that in the mid-90’s holdings above 25% by directors and their relatives was associated
with higher valuation of companies while there was no clear effect below that threshold.
Before the word ‘corporate governance’ became a buzzword in the modern era, Indian
culture & literature widely referred & advocated good corporate governance in spirit
without naming it the practice as corporate governance. The Directive Principles
mandates that the State should work to prevent concentration of wealth and means of
production in a few hands, and try to ensure that ownership and control of the material
resources is distributed to best serve the common good. [Article 38, Constitutional Law
of India] Gandhian philosophy is based on 1st verse of sacred Hindu literature THE
Ishopshinad which vows, “Tena Tyaktena bhunjithah…”, where, one is asked to dedicate
everything to God and then use material things only to the required extent. The message
enshrines that one must not covet what belongs to others. A corporate entity stands on the
pillars of Trusteeship and Accountability. According to a study (1998) conducted on
ownership, 30% businesses are family controlled, 36% are widely held while 18% are
state owned. In India, major business houses are equally controlled by family or
otherwise. 17 of 30 companies in SENSEX (how security index at Bombay Stock
Exchange known as) are family controlled.
Till 1980, majority of big corporate houses in India were family run businesses and
founded by first generation entrepreneurs.  The then biggest & successful business houses
like Tata, Birla & Bajaj practiced voluntarily all good corporate governance practices by
spirit. A century old Memorandum of Tata referred Corporate Social Responsibility and
in spite of absence of any express code for corporate governance, there was no major
failure on governance issues in these business houses. Indian Company Act, 1956
contains express legal code, which are pertaining to good corporate governance practices.
Issues in Family Controlled Business:
Due to high involvement of the promoters in business activities, either at strategic level
or in day-to-day affairs, business performance is better. Due to explicit or implied
concentration of power among family members, they are able to take quick decisions in
response to market demands. Another benefit is obvious, that promoters are continuously
monitoring & protecting assets of the company due to their own stake in the business and
property of the company. On the other hand, modern corporate run as a democratic
principles. If majority of the Board members are in favour of a family, they are able to
take decisions (if not violating any express legal provision) as they like and in family’s
general interest. The good corporate governance principle requires decisions in interest of
the company rather than in interest of member or members or family. More particularly,
in circumstances of conflict of interest, human tendency is inclined to decide in own
favour instead of the company.  Corporate Governance insists otherwise. In second
situation, when, there is a conflict of interest between society and company, human
tendency is to take decision that favours company, corporate governance principles
expects otherwise.
Corporate Governance vis-à-vis Conflict of Interest
This conflict generally happens more frequently & in higher magnitude in family
controlled business after second generation.
Corporate Governance in India:
Corporate Governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s management,
Members of Board, shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance provides
a principled process and structure through which the objectives of the company, the
means of attaining the objectives and systems of monitoring, measuring & rewarding
performance are set. Corporate governance is a set of accepted principles by management
of (1) the indubitable rights of the shareholders as owner of the company and of their own
rule as trustees on behalf of the shareholders, and (2) duty of the key managers when any
actions are detrimental to the society. It is about commitment to values, ethical business
conduct, transparency, making a distinction between personal and corporate resources in
the management of the company and to harmonize conflict of interest. The Annexure-I
provides brief information on the provisions that are directly or indirectly relevant for
good corporate governance, along with the consequences of violation of the particular
provisions.
To ensure good corporate governance, historically there is strong legal framework
existing in India. But due to globalization, cut-throat competition, IT & media invasion,
increasing social expectation, liberalization, political, economical, financial & legal
reforms; existing legal framework is at stake and new corporate governance norms are
evolving. Constitutional Law of India is the source for direction in implementing good
corporate governance. Article 38 directs government to ensure equitable distribution of
wealth and advise state that the government should work to prevent concentration of
wealth and means of production in a few hands, and try to ensure that ownership and
control of the material resources is distributed to best serve the common good.
The structure of ownership of any business determines substantially, the way how the
business is controlled and managed. The ownership structure in modern corporate
generally is dispersed between numerous individual & group of individual or institute/s.
If business is a company, the management & control vest in the hand of Board of
Directors, duly elected by a democratic process as set up by the law. Due to various
reasons, all shareholders are not participating in electing members of the board. The
board members influence in setting & achieving objectives of the company and enjoy
power of using companies’ resources as they like within limits prescribed by Article &
Memorandum of Association and Companies Act. Company has to follow mandates of
relevant Accounting Standards in preparing & reporting Financial Statements. Company
Act provides provisions relating to special procedure when there is conflicting interest of
members of the Board or top management with the interest of the company. If the
company is listed in any stock exchange, it has to further follow provisions of clause 49
of SEBI listing agreement. SEBI also ensure shareholder protection by various checks
and preventing undue advantage of insider information and unfair takeovers. Financial
Statements are the best indicators to report how corporate governance principles are
executed. These statements are prepared on the basis of Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP). Accounting Standards prescribes recognition, valuation, reporting &
disclosure of financial information. The parties to the business transaction may take
undue advantages from international business. Transaction amongst associate concerns &
relatives require special scrutiny. Income Tax Act has enacted provisions to assess value
of the transaction by incorporating principles of Transfer Pricing.
By and large express provision for corporate governance exists for listed companies only.
There are no special provisions for family controlled companies. In year 2007, Central
Government issued guidelines on corporate governance for central public enterprises. It is
voluntary in nature and there are no similar guidelines for state controlled public sector
units as such. Similarly clause 49 applies to the listed companies and there are no express
provisions on corporate governance issues for un-listed companies how so big it is.
Companies Act, 1956 have implied provision that has bearing on corporate governance
that applies to all class of companies. Non-companies, how so big in operation &
importance they have no similar provisions to follow for corporate governance norms.
With the amendment of the Companies Act, 1956 through the subsequent amendment in
1999 & 2006, Accounting Standards are now indirectly integral parts of the Companies
Act, which provides statutory backing. It says that every company and its auditor shall
comply with the Accounting Standards in the manner specified in the rules. The
Accounting Standards shall be applied in the preparation of Financial Statements. Sec.
211 (3) says that every P & L Account and Balance Sheet shall comply with accounting
standards and deviations if any to be disclosed with reasons its financial effect.
The Government of India recognized the importance of financial reporting in providing
essential financial information about the company to its shareholders and other
stakeholders, as an integral and important part of good corporate governance. Such
information needs to be reliable, free from bias and should enable comparison on the
basis of common benchmarks and necessitates an appropriate financial reporting system
in the form of accounting standards that incorporate sound accounting principles and
reflect a true picture of the financial health of the company while ensuring legally
enforceable accountability.
Requirements of the Audit Committee: Audit Committee has a critical role to play in
ensuring the integrity of financial management of the company.  This Committee add
assurance to the shareholders that the auditors, who act on their behalf, are in a position
to safeguard their interests.  Besides the requirements of Clause 49, section 292A of the
Act requires every public having paid up capital of INR 50 million or more shall
constitute a committee of the board to be known as Audit Committee.  As per the Act, the
committee shall consist of at least three directors; two-third of the total strength shall be
directors other than managing or whole time directors.  The Annual Report of the
company shall disclose the composition of the Audit Committee.  The recommendations
of the committee on any matter relating to financial management including Audit Report,
shall be binding on the board.  In case board does not accept the recommendations so
made, the committee shall record the reasons thereof, which should be communicated to
the shareholders, probably through the Corporate Governance Report.  The committee
shall act in accordance with the terms of reference to be specified in writing by the board.
The committee should have periodic discussions with the auditors about the Internal
Control Systems and the scope of audit including the observations of the auditors.  If the
default is made in complying with the said provision of the Act, then the company and
every officer in default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term extending to a
year or with fine up to INR 50000 or both.
Director’s remuneration: Section 309(1) of the Act requires that the remuneration
payable both to the executive as well as non-executive directors is required to be
determined by the board in accordance with and subject to the provisions of section 198
either by the articles of the company or by resolution or if the articles so require, by a
special resolution, passed by the company in a general meeting.  Further, Schedule VI of
the Act requires disclosure of Director’s remuneration and computation of net profits for
that purpose.
Corporate Democracy: Wider participation by the shareholders in the decision making
process is a pre-condition for democratizing corporate bodies.  Due to geographical
distance or other practical problems, a substantially large number of shareholders cannot
attend the general meetings. To overcome these obstacles and pave way for introduction
of real corporate democracy, section 192A of the Act and the Companies (Passing of
Resolution by Postal Ballot), Rules provides for certain resolutions to be approved and
passed by the shareholders through postal ballots.
Listed Companies:
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) guidelines on corporate governance to
listed company is binding. Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement to the Indian stock
exchange came into effect from 31 December 2005. This agreement is between listed
company and the stock exchange with which it is listed. In corporate hierarchy two types
of managements are envisaged: i) companies managed by Board of Directors; and ii)
managed by a Managing Director, whole-time director or manager subject to the control
and guidance of the Board of Directors.
Five broad themes predominate in SEBI corporate governance norms:
1. The independence criteria for directors have been clarified.
2. The roles and responsibilities of the board have been enhanced.
3. The quality and quantity of disclosures have improved.
4. The roles and responsibilities of the audit committee in all matters relating to
internal controls and financial reporting have been consolidated, and
5. The accountability of top management, specifically the CEO and CFO has
been enhanced.
As per Clause 49, for a company with an Executive Chairman, at least 50 per cent of the
board should comprise of independent directors. In the case of a company with a non-
executive Chairman, at least one-third of the board should be independent directors. It
would be necessary for chief executives and chief financial officers to establish and
maintain internal controls and implement remediation and risk mitigation towards
deficiencies in internal controls, among others. Clause VI (ii) of Clause 49 requires all
companies to submit a quarterly compliance report to stock exchange in the prescribed
form. The clause also requires that there be a separate section on corporate governance in
the annual report with a detailed compliance report.
A company is also required to obtain a certificate either from auditors or practicing
company secretaries regarding compliance of conditions as stipulated, and annex the
same to the director's report. The clause mandates composition of an audit committee;
one of the directors is required to be "financially literate".
Following are the non-mandatory requirements:
1. Independent directors may not have tenure not exceeding in the aggregate a
period of nine years on the Board of the company.
2. Companies moving towards a regime of unqualified audit report.
3. Training of board members in the business model of the company as well as risk
profile of the business parameters of the company and responsibilities of directors
and how best to discharge it.
4. Performance evaluation of non-executive directors by a peer group comprising the
entire Board.
5. To set up a whistle blower policy in the company.
Who is an independent director?
The definition of independent directors as given in the amended clause 49 of listing
agreement is an inclusive definition, which defines independent directors as "For the
purpose of this clause the expression 'independent directors' means directors who apart
from receiving director's remuneration, do not have any other material pecuniary
relationship or transactions with the company, its promoters, its management or its
subsidiaries, which in judgment of the board may affect independence of judgment of the
directors."
The definition of the term 'independent directors' has been amended to mean a non-
executive director who:
 Does not have a pecuniary relationship with the company, its promoters, senior
management or affiliate companies.
 Should not be related to promoters or the senior management.
 Has not been an executive with the company in the immediately three preceding
financial years.
 Is not a partner or executive of the auditors/lawyers/consultants of the company;
 Is not a supplier, service provider or customer of the company;
 Does not hold 2% or more shares of the company.
Further, there is certain minimum information that is required to be made available to the
members of the board prior to the board meeting which ranges from annual operating
plans and budgets to labour problems. In addition, a company is also required to lay
down a code of conduct for members of its board as well as the senior management.
These conditions shall apply only to a listed company and unlisted company with paid-up
capital and free reserves of Rs 100 million, or a company having a turnover of Rs 500
million and above for the financial year beginning 2003. The number of independent
directors who are to be on the board shall not be less than 50 per cent of its total strength
for these companies.
In any case, nominee directors are to be excluded while computing the percentage of the
independent director. The minimum number of directors for a listed company, and to the
categories to whom these rules are applicable, shall not be less than seven, of which, four
shall be independent directors.
As regards the three categories of companies to which the various recommendations
apply, it has been specifically stated that the audit committee would only constitute
independent directors.
Failure to comply with clause 49 of SEBI's listing agreement is punishable with
imprisonment of up to 10 years or a fine of up to INR 250 million or both. Besides, stock
exchanges can suspend the dealing/trading of securities.
Public Sector Companies:
The Government of India issued guidelines on corporate governance for central public
sector undertakings in June 2007. The government emphasized the need for public
accountability of the public sector management regarding its duties and responsibilities
and hence it was considered necessary to formally adopt guidelines on corporate
governance for the public sector undertakings. The ministry formulated guidelines on
Corporate Governance for Central Public Sector Enterprises. These guidelines were
evolved keeping in view the provisions of the relevant laws, rules and instructions and
through a consultation process where the stakeholders have participated. Thus, it was
imperative that ethics and probity are maintained in the functioning of CPSEs. Good
Corporate Governance practices, therefore, should be built into the management systems
of CPSEs.
These guidelines cover issues like composition of Board of Directors, setting up of Audit
Committees, role and powers of Audit Committees, issues relating to subsidiary
companies, disclosures, accounting standards, risk management, compliance and
schedule of implementation, etc. These guidelines though voluntary in nature should be
followed by all CPSEs as proper implementation of these guidelines would protect the
interests of shareholders and relevant stakeholders. The compliance with these guidelines
requires to be reflected in the Directors’ report, Annual Report and Chairman’s speech in
the Annual General Meeting. This Department would also grade the CPSEs on the basis
of their compliance of the corporate governance guidelines.
For the purpose of evolving Guidelines on corporate governance, CPSEs have been
categorised into two groups, namely, (i) those listed in the Stock Exchanges; (ii) those not
listed in the Stock Exchanges. In so far as listed CPSEs are concerned, they have to
follow the SEBI guidelines on corporate governance. In addition, they may follow those
provisions in these guidelines which do not exist in the SEBI guidelines and also do not
contradict any provisions in the SEBI guidelines.
 Board of Directors
 Audit Committee
 Subsidiary Companies
 Disclosures
 Report, Compliance and Schedule of Implementation
Family Based Business & Corporate Governance:
Family relationships have to be managed in addition to business relationships
Special requirements to manage growth;
Picking and promoting the right members of the family;
Providing attractive opportunities to managers from outside the family;
Demonstrable even-handedness in training, promoting, compensation and benefits
Formal structure; if family firms are to manage growth successfully, they have to adopt a
clear organizational structure which would include:
An effective board concentrating on policy and strategy
In a typical non-family business, any involved individual can be an employee, a manager,
an owner, a director, or some combination of these roles. In a family-owned business
however, matters become more complex as an individual can have multiple roles and
responsibilities. These multiple roles are usually associated with different incentives,
which increase the challenges that family businesses face as opposed to their non-family
counterparts (Neubauer et al, 1998). The complex interaction of the family and the
company that it controls creates several difficult governance issues in addition to those
faced by other companies, including: succession planning for the family management;
family versus non-family employment and promotion; equitable treatment of non-family
shareholders; and the role of family meetings vis-à-vis Board meetings and shareholders
meetings (IFC, 2007).
Challenges, Strengths and Weaknesses
Globalization has led to fierce competition and increasing consumer demands. Family
businesses especially have to respond to these challenges effectively in order to avoid
shrinking in size and diminishing accordingly. Because of their nature, family businesses
face their own set of challenges and obstacles on many fronts: operational, legal,
marketing, financial and business-development. Hughes argues that successful family
businesses feature a strong and compelling vision of their future development, which is
the characteristic horizon of family businesses as opposed to other ownership models.
Such a vision has to be sustained by entrepreneurial values like respecting the company
as a public good, to be preserved and developed to the benefit of all relevant
stakeholders. Sometimes, vision and values are implicit and somewhat “hidden” behind
entrepreneurs’ thoughts and ideas. On the contrary, in successful companies these values
are shared by all owners, whose cohesion is constantly kept alive and monitored through
open and systematic communication
This is a fundamental challenge for family businesses, as they tend to neglect the
importance of communication in the erroneous belief that being part of the same family
naturally makes it happen or, worse, means it is not really necessary. Instead, even within
the same family, lack of communication undermines trust amongst its members; in turn,
decreased trust undermines unity which will sooner or later affect the company, therefore
decreasing the quality of decision making (Hughes, 2004). Other major challenges faced
by family-owned businesses include differing family member goals and expectations, and
jealousy and interference from some disgruntled family members can plague the
operation of family businesses in ways that do not affect non-family run businesses. The
degree to which the business depends on one individual, namely, the principal owner-
manager substantially affects how well a family business works (Friedman, 1998). Risk
Aversion: Family businesses are commonly at a disadvantage when it comes to acquiring
resources, largely because their owners are predisposed to being more risk averse.
Family-owned businesses have been hit by the economic downturn like many others. But
while they have suffered along with everyone else, they are able to leverage an inherent
competitive advantage to ensure they survive and prosper despite the poor business and
financial climate.
According to Randel Carlock, Professor of Family Business and Berghmans Lhoist
Chaired Professor in Entrepreneurial leadership at INSEAD, this advantage encompasses
committed owners, long-term strategies, industry knowledge accumulated over
generations, and values such as trust, stewardship and longevity.
However, such characteristics on their own do not ensure survival or success. More than
at any other time, businesses need competent leadership. Some 95 per cent of businesses
in Asia, the Middle East, Italy and Spain are family-controlled. So are over 80 eighty per
cent of companies in France and Germany, and between 60-70 per cent of those in the
US.
Wal-Mart, Fiat, Ford, Peugeot, Cargill, Michelin, Gap, IKEA, BMW. There’s a family
behind the largest block of voting stock in each of those companies. Make no mistake
about it, family business are a major source of wealth creation and employment.
“Family businesses are unique in two main ways,” Carlock says. “First, they hold a long-
term perspective; and second, they are driven by values. Their decisions tend to be based
around what’s good for the family, what upholds the values they hold. But you also have
family emotions, and so you need professional management. It’s all about these
‘professional-emotional’ families – combining family passion with professional
management.”
Ford was the only of the three US carmakers not forced into bankruptcy. Did the family’s
name on the dashboard make a difference? “The Ford family made sure Ford was
protected: ownership and legacy. They took on long-term debt before the real trouble hit
so the company wouldn’t have to go to the government and beg for money. Toyota, Fiat,
BMW and VW (all family businesses) are also well-positioned.”
Carlock has similar stories in the banking sector. “Pictet, Banco Santander, Julius Baer,
Lombard Odier … all family-controlled, none of them in serious trouble because the
family owners said to the employees ‘we’re not out to make quick money; don’t see how
many risky products you can sell, just make good solid investments for our clients.’ They
were concerned about their businesses, not their bonuses.”
Then there were the battling Bancrofts – heirs to the Dow Jones publishing business. The
older generation acted as stewards of a great journalistic heritage, heralded by the Wall
Street Journal; the younger, third generation saw a bleak future for the industry itself and
a share price that wouldn’t budge. Rupert Murdoch – himself embroiled in family
business skirmishes – faced no competition in his bid for the Bancroft family business.
The Bancrofts lost their business because they lacked a shared vision and which to build
the family’s commitment.
“Firms don’t last more than three generations,” Carlock says. “They go bankrupt or they
merge or they close down because they just can’t face the competition. If you look at the
Fortune 500 in 1955, you will see just 77 of those companies are around today. In family
firms, problem is part strategy, and part the family itself. If a family can align its values
and vision and communicate its values and agree to invest their human and financial
capital, they will succeed.”
Carlock believes communication among family members is the main key to success. “If a
family doesn’t communicate, they are no better than any other business,” he says. Other
strengths that family businesses have and which translate well in the business world at
large include:
Stewardship:
This is like corporate social responsibility, says Carlock. Thinking in the long term
instead of 90-day cycles. Family businesses do this naturally. It’s their name on the
business, out in the community, for posterity.”
Values:
Look at Apple, Carlock says by way of example. “The fear everyone had over Steve
Jobs’ health was not so much about him per se; it was about his values – who would be
able to be the innovator, staying out there in front of the competition?”
Encourage entrepreneurship:
Almost every family business in the world was started by an entrepreneur,” says Carlock.
This spirit continues to keep the company alive and regenerating. And it shores up long-
term performance levels.
Ability to crystallize the family’s vision for itself in the future:
In times of economic crisis this vision is especially important, as it can re-direct
otherwise destructive and inhibiting emotions such as fear and anger. "Real leaders
recognise the emotional impact of their leadership style on the company and its
employees," states Carlock.
Risk Aversion:
Family businesses are commonly at a disadvantage when it comes to acquiring resources,
largely because their owners are predisposed to being more risk averse. Another major
challenge facing family businesses is the human resource challenge. In family-owned
business, the family has to be always accommodated first with jobs. This is a facet
nobody can deny. But the bigger problem is not hiring of incompetent family members
but how they affect other employees. In some cases, family members and relatives can
demoralize the organization by their dealings with other employees. They may loaf on the
job, avoid unpleasant tasks, take special privileges, make drastic errors and not be
reprimanded etc. (Hughes, 2004). HR challenge also includes defining authority. It is
very difficult in family businesses to define authority. If a younger member is made CEO,
he/she may find it very difficult to tell elder members of the family to change their style
of functioning. The younger cannot caste off his role in the family of an obedient
youngster and take on the role of the leader of the business.
The HR challenges discussed above create another serious problem; retaining non family
professionals. Mahayny suggests that it is a huge challenge in some family-owned
companies to retain non family professionals. This is mainly because promotions are
closed to them after a certain point and they see relatives being pushed into executive
offices in spite of not being competent. This affects their growth aspects because no
family can have members that can look after all aspects of business (Mahayny, 2007).
Allen further suggests that this makes family businesses avoid bringing in outsiders
because they believe that it threatens the security of the family (Allen, 2007). Non
participative family members: Every family business has some members who are actively
involved in the business but there are stake holders who are not actively part of the
business like mother, sisters, uncles, aunts, in-laws, etc. These people are interested only
in dividends and earnings and not in the growth of the business. On the other hand,
relatives who are engaged in daily operations judge major matters from the viewpoint of
the production, sales and personnel necessary to make the company successful.
Obviously, these two viewpoints may conflict in many instances (Hughes, 2004).
Family businesses are much more about family than business. Family businesses begin as
families, and each family has its own unique unwritten rules, values, histories, and
communication methods (EJB, 2006). These variables each have impacts on the business
in different ways, sometimes positive and sometimes not. Therefore, a family business
cannot be truly understood unless there is an understanding of the family and individuals
behind the company. Family participation in a business can strengthen the business
because family members are very loyal and dedicated to the family enterprise. However,
and as Mahayny put it, one of the key reasons for family business failure is the inter-
relationship between the family and the business which results in business decisions
being strongly affected by social and non-business related factors (Mahayny, 2007).
Rivers has also emphasized that managing a family business, and particularly succession
planning, can present some unique problems for similar reasons as family interests often
conflict with business interests, for example hiring a family member who is less
competent than a non-family member or keeping an underperforming family member in a
position when their performance is hurting the company. Psychologists are often
consulted to help families successfully manage issues that affect both the family and the
business (Rivers, 2005).
While it is helpful to understand the conditions that lead to healthy and unhealthy family
businesses, most family businesses cannot be classified as either completely healthy or
unhealthy; each has certain strengths and weaknesses. Indeed, the uniqueness of family
businesses is best understood by examining their strengths and weaknesses, often
different sides of the same coin. Whether a particular dimension of a family business is
strength or a weakness depends on three factors: (1) the degree to which the boundaries
between the family and the business are managed; (2) the health of each system; and (3)
the degree to which adaptability and learning is inhibited or encouraged in the boundary
interface.
Some of the major challenges faced by family-owned businesses are:
Non participative family members: Every family-owned business have some members
who are actively involved in the business but there are stake holders who are not actively
part of the business like mother, sisters, uncles, aunts, in-laws etc. These people are
interested only in dividends and earnings and not in the growth of the business they are
unable to comprehend the problems of operating a business. Relatives who are engaged
in daily operations judge major matters from the viewpoint of the production, sales and
personnel necessary to make the company successful. Obviously, these two viewpoints
may conflict in many instances.
Family emotions: Emotion is a big dimension in family-owned firms, as brothers and
sisters, uncles and aunts, nephews and nieces, and fathers and children work together.
The problem arises in recognition of these dimensions of emotions and to make objective
decisions. It is hard to make objective decisions about the skills and abilities of each
other, especially when some members rake up unpleasant instances to question abilities.
Emotional outbursts are many in family-owned businesses and the quarrels and ill
feelings of relatives have a way of spreading out to include non-family employees. It is
very difficult to keep the bickering from interfering with work and the company becomes
divided into warring camps.
It is very difficult to keep emotions out of anything. It is believed by many business
thinkers that emotions are very essential to operate a business. But these emotions and
passion have to be related to business. Family-owned business finds family emotions
playing havoc with business. Ego clashes, sibling rivalry, hurt among the earlier
generation, dissatisfaction, feeling of being left out, deriving importance etc are some of
the problems that are general seen. The head of the family has a very large role to ensure
that these emotions stay out of business. Controlling of ego clashes and sibling rivalry is
tough but all the same if the head of the family encourages open communication among
family members and has a system of mentoring every member who enters the family
business then these issues can be controlled. Family or Business what comes first?: The
family-owned business management needs to be very clear about the demarcation
between family and business. The blurring of line between the two leads to business
decision that is in the interest of the family and not in the interest of the business. In case
the business needs to survive along side the international organisation the family needs to
take a back seat and the interest of the business needs to precede, some time at the cost of
certain family relations.
Priority of family vs. business: India as a country has a very high family orientation. It
is therefore seen that family members are trusted with all important jobs. It is difficult to
give a job to an outsider if a member of the family has shown an interest in the same.
Some times jobs and responsibilities are given to family members in spite of being aware
of their inability to perform assigned duties. This ultimately affects the business and its
bottom line.
Defining Authority: It is very difficult in family businesses to define authority. If a
younger member is made CEO he/she may find it very difficult to tell his father/mother,
uncles/aunts, grandparents or elder members of the family to change their style of
functioning. The youngster cannot caste off his role in the family of an obedient
youngster and takes on the role of the leader of the business. Many members in the
family also tend to overlook decisions taken by younger members even if they are at
positions of authority. This makes management of the business very difficult for the
younger generation. "Family employees" should discipline themselves to work within the
bounds of these lines of authority.
Every family members needs to be told clearly about his/her role in the business and
overstepping into other peoples authority especially those of non-family professionals
must be discouraged. Even among family members even if a younger members of the
family is at a position his authority should not be overlooked by other elders of the family
because if that is done other employees may also not respect his position and may spread
rumours outside of the business to the effect that can harm the business.
Human Resource: In family business the family has to be always accommodated first
with jobs. The bigger problem is not hiring of incompetent family members but how they
affect other employees. In some cases, family members and relatives can demoralize the
organization by their dealings with other employees. They may loaf on the job, avoid
unpleasant tasks, take special privileges, make drastic errors and not be reprimanded etc.
Untalented family members should be put in jobs where they will have minimum contact
with other employees, out of the mainstream of decision making.
Retaining non family professionals: It is a big challenge in some family-owned
companies to retain non family professionals such companies are plagued with a high
turnover. This is mainly because promotions are closed to them after a certain point and
they see relatives being pushed into executive offices in spite of not being competent.
Family-owned businesses have not been able to keep the morale of their non family
professionals very high this has effected their growth aspects because no family can have
members that can look after all aspects of business. Outsiders are necessary and
managing them is very important.
Recruitment and human capital management are major factors in a family firm’s long-
term success. A governance system that provides clear guidelines for employing family
or non-family members and impartial performance based promotion is essential to the
sustainability of business.
No family-owned firm can have enough, aptly trained family members to look after all
the all the functions of the business. As family-owned firs grow in size they also need
professionals at top positions. Non-family professionals have always felt left out or
alienated, the management may not be going out of its way to make them feel so but the
closeness of the family makes the divide very strong plus the preferences given to family
members the absolute absence of punishment or reprimand to them also creates a
problems. If the family is promoting non competent members for top position it is even
worse. In order to grow family-owned firms need to strictly put in HR policies that are
same of both non-family and family members. Thos the compassion and familiarity will
not and cannot change efforts can be made to curb it.
Speed of accepting change: Change is something that does not happen in family-owned
Businesses in India, change is undertaken as a last resort when it is believed that the
business will close down. In order to survive in the global arena it is essential for
business houses to change at a fast rate and adapt to changing business times.
Family-owned businesses in India have lived in a protected business environment of very
long. They are a little slow when it comes to accepting change as compared to their
counterparts across the globe. Family-owned businesses are not used to spending money
on R&D and also ploughing back profits into technology development. The family
(which also holds the majority of the stock) has got used to fat dividends and is not ready
to give them up for the purpose of growth of the firm. The younger members in the
family understand the importance of change and they must try and convince the elder
members and non-participative members on the importance of change and the increase in
earning capacity after the change.
Fair to all approach: Family in India have always prided themselves in being fair to all
in the family. Inspite of large families with limited resources, traditionally believe in “mil
bant ke khanna” this philosophy has also manifested itself in family-owned businesses
where the business pie must he shared by all equality and the sharing must not mean that
any member of the family gets less. This thus results in fragmentation of business and
cross holdings to ensure that the weaker family members share is taken care of even if
he/she cannot operate his business. In families this philosophy has worked wonderfully
but in business it has spelled doom because Indian family businesses are split up in every
generation thus keeping the size small and uneconomical as compared to global
standards. Cross holding have meant that the rivalry within the business continues and
there is bitterness among family members that adversely affects business.
Open decision-making and procedures that ensure fairness in evaluating and rewarding
both family and non-family employees are essential tools in avoiding tensions and raising
the reputation of company.
Succession Planning: Succession planning is almost absent in family-owned business in
India. Even the biggest private sector company in India Reliance faced huge problems
after the patriarch died because there was not clear succession planning it was believed
that the younger brother would stay under the wings of the elder brother though the
cracks were visible even when Dhirubhai Ambani was alive. The split in the company
was not amicable and resulted in a lost of loss to the investors wealth and Reliance
slipped from its position in the Forbes List. If business leaders like Dhirubhai Ambani
who is revered for his foresight in Indian business did not tackle the issue of succession
very little is expected from other business houses.
Leadership succession is a challenge for all companies, but particularly for family
businesses. To ensure that leadership transition does not disrupt company’s growth, you
need to have clear policies for the selection of the right family member. Successful
family businesses are the result of years of hard work and dedication. To pass on this
success, corporate governance needs to be made part of the family firm’s culture.
Managing Growth
As family firms expand, the relationship between owners, managers and employees
becomes more complex. A good corporate governance system puts in place the right
policies to manage this complexity. It creates a solid organizational structure that clarifies
roles, reporting lines and delegation of responsibility. Corporate governance also draws
the line between ownership and management and separates policy direction from the day-
to-day running of the company. Family members may have conflicts among themselves
on the running of the company. A solid governance system helps resolve such conflicts
allowing family members to focus on other key issues.
Succession planning is more specific in family business. Succession planning must not
mean dividing the pie among all family members but it must mean finding a role of each
family member in the group without having to divide the group. This is a long way but if
planned right from the time the younger generation enters the enters the business. If the
younger generation is convinced about their skills and role in the firm where the eldest
may or may not necessarily be the group CEO and the best man is the CEO, he may be
non-family too the business has a larger chance of staying together.
If the business is not split they have a chance to compete with the best in the world. If all
the cotton mills and jute mills of the all the Birla Group are put together they will be a
very formidable force in the world cotton and jute market but since they are fragmented
over different family groups they are not even leaders in the domestic market. Being fair
to all in succession planning is absolutely not possible because all children may not be
equally gifted in business such family members who do not have a flair for business can
be compensated in other terms like giving them a fixed income or giving them property
which is worth same in value etc. What need to go to whom should actually not be
decided by the family this job should be handed over to an outsider who will not be
biased in his assessment.
As is evident from the challenges listed the biggest challenges of family-owned business
are not being able to demark between family and business. The line between the two is
very blur and they seem to intermingle. It is very difficult to keep the family aside and
then manage the business because family has always held center stage in India and
traditions do not permit to be straight forward and tell family members some home truths.
This inability to communicate will family members on their role in the business has
resulted in conflicts that have ruined the growth of family businesses. The person
designated by the family and the shareholders to manage the family firm has to take a few
strong steps even if they may hurt family members in the interest of the business. If the
business prospers the family also stands to gain.
The challenges can be taken care of without going into drastic mode of getting an
outsider to manage the business, though some times it may be necessary, but have a
strong communication network by the CEO with the family and the non-family members
in the business. Non participative family members: Every family has non-participative
family members. These are members of the family who are given a share in the business
for reasons that make no business sense most of the time. Stock holding is given to
parents out of respect and they generally think in the interest of the business but some
times their interests may clash with the business because they are trying to protect the
interest of the family.
Strengths
Research shows that family businesses enjoy many advantages. When a family commits
itself to building a profitable enterprise this gives it a competitive advantage due to the
market trust in the company due to family reputation as well as the perception that the
family has vast interest in preserving the company for future generations (Bin Saleh,
2006). Also, one of the strengths of a family business is that all family members are
committed to a single common goal that they work on achieving. There is no conflict of
interest because the family owns and manages the firm which makes decision-making a
somehow easier process. In addition, operating a family business involves incurring
minimum overheads because a family firm depends on the family's own resources. A
family firm is managed out of a long term perspective because the family interest is
viewed as a continuing one. Families in business make it a priority to pass their
accumulated knowledge, experience, and skills to the next generations. Family firms
usually have a clear identity in a faceless world that has become now almost with no
identity. Therefore, family businesses usually enjoy a strong and homogenous culture that
s shared by all family members as well as those who work with them. Family firms work
on improving their outputs and maintaining good relationships with their partners
(customers, suppliers, employees, community…etc. because they have their name and
reputation associated with their goods or services (see Cadbury, 2000 and Abouzaid,
2007).
Weaknesses
Despite all their strengths, family businesses have some serious weaknesses that threaten
their success and even existence sometimes. Research shows that family businesses face
significant challenges of continuity, longevity, and ultimately success. In many family
businesses there is no formal succession planning. For instance, a recent study on North
American films showed that 58% of surveyed family businesses did not have any
succession plans (EJB, 2006). Another family business weakness is that the family
relationships are not separated from the business relationships and that there is no relief
from the one in the other, this, according to Mahayny, results in many business decisions
made based on family, rather than business, considerations(Mahayny, 2007). Zidan gives
some examples of factors leading to non-economic factors affecting business decisions.
This includes job creation for the family, generating income for some family members,
family peace, and enhancing the family image in the local community (Zidan, 2008).
Furthermore, when the second generation comes to the firm, the business relationships
may not be managed successfully because in this case the business hierarchy might not
match that of the family. In addition, when the firm grows it usually has to draw in non
family managers which will call for managing relationships between family and non
family members of the firm. Besides, as the firm grows, ownership is spread more widely
among the family, the proportion of non family to family managers increases, and
tensions between family members increase because their interests become diversified
particularly between those who are actively involved in managing the firm – caring about
its growth and more investments – and those who are solely concerned about dividends
and the capital value of their holdings (Cadbury, 2000).
Friedman argues that in the majority of cases, family businesses fail to survive a
transition in leadership from one generation to the next due to conflicts between family
members (Friedman, 1998). Furthermore, and according to the Small Business
Administration's Office of Advocacy, 580,900 new businesses were launched in 2004,
the most recent date available for data, while 576,200 closed. Given that only one in three
family businesses succeeds in making it from the first to the second generation, it's clear
they have their own inherent risks. Each succeeding generation has its own ideas about
taking the company forward - or if; indeed, it wants to join the family business at all.
Successful transition has always been crucial to the continued success of family
businesses - and the next 10 years will see a major increase in the number of companies
facing that hurdle, as more baby boomers begin to retire.
Access to Capital
But firms can obtain external financing in a number of ways besides issuing shares to the
public, such as reinvesting profits, borrowing money or selling shares through private
placements.
In such cases, providers of non-public sources of capital (banks, pension funds, insurance
companies, venture capitalists, private-equity investors, etc.) expect to look out for
themselves. They will want to secure their loans with company assets, to be able to
accelerate repayment of loans if the company’s performance falters, and to review books
and records directly. They will seek direct assurances from the company’s auditor and
officers, or personal guarantees from the company’s owners. They will demand the right
to approve major transactions or money transfers. For these capital providers, typical
corporate-governance practices, such as board review of transactions between
management and the company, board committees, non-executive directors, or separate
CEO/board chairmen, hold little interest.
Data on family-run firms raise additional questions about the access-to-capital argument.
Of those 244 OECD family-run firms with revenues of $1 billion or more (“large firms”),
only half are publicly traded. At the same time, the average ages of publicly traded and
privately held large firms are about the same, suggesting that large private firms have
been able to access sufficient capital without inevitably “evolving” into publicly traded
firms.
This observation is bolstered by European data showing that the average company
operates for 40 years before going public, and that when such a company does go public,
nearly 60% of the money raised from its initial public offerings goes into the pockets of
family shareholders rather than into the business. In many cases, therefore, wealth
diversification or liquidity may be a greater issue for family-run businesses than
financing operations.
Studies indicate that the stronger a country’s corporate governance, the more robust its
capital markets and the higher its level of external financing as a percentage of GNP.
However, while these findings may persuade policymakers, at the level of the individual
family firm the slogan “embrace corporate governance in order to access capital” can
remain a tough sell.
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Family businesses draw special strength from the shared history, identity, and common
language of families. When key managers are relatives their traditions, values, and
priorities spring from a common source. Verbal and non verbal communications can be
greatly speeded up in families. Spouses and siblings are more likely to understand each
other's spoken preferences and hidden strengths and weaknesses. Most important,
commitment, even to the point of self-sacrifice, can be asked for in the name of the
general family welfare. Allen considers that the “Agency Theory” explains most of the
difference between family businesses and other companies where she makes the contrast
between agent-managers who manage but not own and owners-managers who own as
well as manage (Allen, 2006) However, this same intimacy can also be detrimental to the
professionalism of executive behavior. Life long histories and family dynamics can
intrude in business relationships. Authority may be harder to exercise with relatives.
Roles in the family and in the business can become confused. Business pressures
overload and burn out family relationships. When they're working poorly, families can
create levels of tension, anger, confusion, and despair that can destroy good business and
healthy families amazingly quickly. The public is well aware of family tragedies that can
accompany business disasters (Gersick et al., 1997). Zafft argues that family businesses
tend to believe that principles of good corporate governance do not really concern them
but he considers this to be a wrong view (Zafft, 2002). family businesses operate in
almost the same work environment as publicly traded companies, and they have some
strengths and weaknesses. Also family firms face many problems that are specifically
related to this type of business such as problems with recruiting and retaining capable non
family managers, succession planning, etc. The key to running a successful family firm is
to select and retain the right members of the family and equally to provide attractive
opportunities to non family managers. This requires a clear line to be drawn between
direction, which is the job of the board, and management which is the job of the
executives (Cadbury, 2000). Therefore, family firms need to apply the principles of
corporate governance in order to capitalize on the strengths and avoid or minimize the
weaknesses. In fact, some of the family businesses can be quite successful and enjoy a
long life. Bhattacharyya documents for example that some of the worlds’ oldest firms are
in fact family businesses such as Kongo Gumi in Japan that was established in 578 AD
and is now managed by the 30th generation (Bhattacharyya, 2004).
In a family-run firm, a single person or group enjoys a controlling interest and can
appoint family members as managers, or can unilaterally appoint, monitor, compensate
and fire third-party managers. This situation may threaten minority shareholders with
exploitation, but offers the controlling family the best of both worlds: it can run the
business as it sees fit and gamble, at least partly, with other people’s money. As a
consequence, if the purpose of corporate governance is to constrain managers and control
shareholders, one may well ask whether a family-run firm would ever really want it.
The answer to this question is “yes”, but not necessarily for the reason most commonly
given: better access to capital. One often hears the argument that, when investors refuse
to put their money in companies with bad governance, the cost of capital for such
companies goes up, making them uncompetitive. Eventually, so the argument goes, the
owners/managers of such companies must either mend their ways or go out of business.
Fortunately for the corporate-governance industry, a compelling case for corporate
governance can still be made, and it involves the greatest challenge family-run businesses
face: management succession. Succession issues resonate strongly with business owners.
While the founder of a family-run firm might believe that raising money or diversifying
wealth will never pose a problem, one thing he does know for sure is that some day he
will die.
Keeping a business going across generations is hard. In fact, North American and UK
studies indicate that only about one in six family-run firms survives to the third
generation. Failure to maintain the family business can stem from any number of causes.
Divisions form between those relatives enjoying both salaries and dividends and those
receiving only dividends. Jealousies emerge as some family employees rise higher than
others or work less hard for the same pay. Supervisors find themselves incapable of firing
an under-performing subordinate who is a child or a sibling or a cousin.
As the business grows and markets evolve, finding sufficient managerial talent and
experience within the family becomes harder. Where the family decides at last to hire an
outside manager, failure to motivate and monitor him can damage or destroy the
business.
Corporate governance goes to the heart of these problems, though many family-run firms
have never thought of it in these terms. Families need corporate governance both to
operate the business and to promote family harmony. This means putting in place
decision-making and monitoring procedures that are open and fair, as well as possibly
hiring non-family members as advisors, managers and directors.
It is not an overnight exercise, and often, by the time the need for corporate governance
has been recognized, family relationships or the business’s prospects have deteriorated
beyond repair.
Family-run businesses can represent the work, and the wealth of several generations. If
business owners want to preserve, enlarge and pass on this legacy, they need to make
corporate governance a family affair.
Corporate governance refers to the processes, structures, policies and laws that govern the
management of a company. It also refers to the way the Board oversees the operations of
a company and about how board members are accountable to the company and its
shareholders. The key purpose of corporate governance is to promote accountability,
transparency, fairness, disclosure and responsibility - core values that are relevant to the
success of all businesses, irrespective of where they come from. Companies with sound
corporate governance usually perform better than other companies.
Good corporate governance results in:
• Better access to external capital
• Lower financing costs
• Higher credit ratings
• Strong investor confidence
In two important recent studies Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2004, 2005) put together an
ownership time-series for the United Kingdom and establish that ownership in the United
Kingdom has dispersed very quickly once a company has been taken public or following
mergers and acquisitions. They find, in particular, that rapid dispersion occurred and
substantial amounts of external finance were raised even in the early 19th century, at a
time when corporate law gave very little protection to minority shareholders.
Other recent studies have revisited the link between ownership concentration and
shareholder monitoring. Thus, Anderson and Reeb (2003) study the performance of
family-controlled listed firms, which they point out represent a significant proportion of
the largest listed companies even in the U.S. (18% of the S&P 500). They find that family
firms consistently outperform their peers, as measured by both accounting yardsticks like
return on assets and market-valuation measures such as Tobin’s q. This above average
performance can also be seen in the lower cost of debt financing for family-run firms
(Anderson, Mansi and Reeb, 2003). This evidence thus provides strong support for the
view that ownership concentration improves governance and performance at least for
family owned firms.
Most of the theoretical literature on large shareholders only considers ownership
structures where all but one shareholder are small. Zwiebel (1995) is a recent exception.
He considers ownership structures where there may be more than one large shareholder
and also allows for alliances among small block holders. In such a setting he shows that
one of the roles of a large block holding is to fend off alliances of smaller block holders
that might compete for control [see also Gomes and Novaes (2000) and Bloch and Hege
(2000) for two other recent formal analyses of ownership structures with multiple large
shareholders]. An entirely different perspective on the role of large outside shareholders
is given in Muller and Warneryd (2001) who argue that outside owners can reduce
inefficient rent seeking of insiders and managers by inducing them to join forces to fight
the outsider’s own rent seeking activities. This story fits well the situation of many
second-generation family-owned firms, who decide to open up their ownership to
outsiders in an attempt to stop feuding among family members.
Aghion and Bolton (1992) consider a situation where ownership is concentrated and
argue that family-owned firms want to limit control by outside investors because they
value the option of being able to pursue actions in the future which may not be profit
maximizing. They may value family control so much that they may want to turn down
acquisition bids even if they are worth more than the net present value of the current
business. Or, they may prefer to keep the business small and under family control even if
it is more profitable to expand the business. In some situations, however, they may have
no choice but to relinquish some if not all control to the outside investor if they want to
secure capital at reasonable cost. Aghion and Bolton show that under some conditions the
efficient contractual arrangement is to have a state-contingent control allocation, as under
debt financing or under standard venture capital arrangements. Although their model only
considers a situation of bilateral contracting with incomplete contracts it captures some
basic elements of a multi-constituency situation and provides a rationale for extending
control to other constituencies than shareholders.
Recent failures include undetected off-balance sheet loans to a controlling family
(Adelphia) combined with alleged self-dealing by CEOs and other company employees
(Computer Associates, Dynegy, Enron, Global Crossing, Qwest, Tyco), deliberate
misleading of investors (Kmart, Lucent Technologies, WorldCom), insider trading
(ImClone Systems) and/or fraud (Rite Aid) (“Accounting Scandals Spread Across Wall
Street”, Financial Times, 26 June 2002).
The method was also applied in other countries, finding the owner-controlled firms
significantly outperform manager-controlled firms in the UK [Radice (1971), Steer and
Cable (1978), Cosh and Hughes (1989), Leech and Leahy (1991)], 156 profitability is
higher with family control in France [Jacquemin and de Ghellinck (1980)]. 157 Demsetz
and Lehn (1985) explain that ownership concentration is endogenous. Some firms require
large shareholder control while others don’t. They argue that without accounting for this
endogeneity it is to be expected that a regression of firm performance on a control
dummy in a cross-section of heterogeneous firms should produce no statistically
significant relation if the observed ownership-performance combinations are efficient.
This is true especially in an area such as shareholder meetings and voting processes
where the fix is relatively simple and inexpensive to implement.  Prompt action will
make Indian markets more transparent and appealing to foreign capital and enable India
to become an increasingly important international financial center.
 Shareholder meetings and voting
 Related-party transactions
 Preferential warrants
 Corporate disclosure
 The auditing profession
A question of performance accountability…the various legal frameworks for corporate
activity to ultimately deal with the questions, to whom and for what corporations shall be
held accountable
A company in which a family or a business group has controlling interest and family and
group is free to appoint members or manager
Family capitalism precedes shareholder capitalism
Concentrated ownership exists at any point of time because of institutional voids, the
absence of specialized intermediaries in capital market
Pyramid structure helps in tapping equity capital while retaining controlling interest
Groups and concentrated ownership are robust form of business
They lasts centuries and changing their footprints and functional form and weathering
shocks
If family business is not rent seeking or entry deterring then it is not bad
1. Accounting quality
2. value creation
3. fair policies and actions
4. communication
5. effective governing board
6. reliability
Detailed agenda for shareholder meetings are often not easily available. Many
companies neither upload these documents to the websites of the two main Indian stock
exchanges (the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and the National Stock Exchange
(NSE)), nor do they make them clearly available on their own websites. Second, votes
are customarily counted in India by a “show of hands” rather than by a “poll.” This
former method effectively gives each shareholder an equal voice regardless of the
number of shares it owns. But the inequity does not stop there. Under Indian law,
proxies are not allowed to speak at meetings or vote on a show of hands. Even though
they can vote on a poll, since voting by a show of hands is the norm, the proxy votes of
shareholders who cannot attend meetings are seldom counted. Third, the lack of voting
by poll also means a lack of detailed information on the results of meetings. Even if polls
are called, the results are not always published on the company’s website because there is
no legal requirement to do so.
Governance (Openness Index) and the decision-making quality (Extension Index) BoD
composition
1. Does the company have its own written corporate governance rules that clearly
describe its value system and board responsibilities?
2. Does the company offer other ownership right beyond voting?
3. Does the company explicitly mention the safety and welfare of its employees?
4. What is the quality of the notice of the Annual General Meeting?
5. Does the company have a corporate vision?
6. Does the company have a transparent ownership structure?
7. Does the board of directors provide a code of ethics and statement of business
conduct for all directors and employees?
8. Is there any membership to allow minority shareholders to influence board
composition?
9. Is the chairman an independent director?
10. Do the shareholders approve the decision on the remuneration of board members
or executives annually?
11. Does the board appoint independent committees with independent members to
carry out critical responsibilities such as audit?
12. Does the company have an internal audit operation established as a separate unit
in the company?
13. Does the company have a board of director’s report in the annual report?
14. Does the board disclose critical information to the public through effective
channels?
15. Does the disclosure include profit forecast and operation guidelines?
Torrent Pharmaceuticals Limited
Company’s Philosophy on Corporate Governance
The Company believes that the Code prescribes only a minimum framework for
governance of a business in corporate framework. The Company’s philosophy is to
develop this desired minimum framework and institutionalise the spirit it entails. This
will lay the foundation for further development of superior governance practices which
are vital for growing a successful business. The Company recognises that transparency,
disclosure, financial controls and accountability are the pillars of any good system of
corporate governance. It is the Company’s endeavour to attain highest level of
governance to enhance the stakeholder’s value.
Board of Directors
The Board comprises of 8 directors of which 6 are Non-Executive Directors (75% of the
Board strength) and 4 are Independent Directors (50% of the Board strength). The
composition of the Board complies with the requirements of the Code.
Nirma Limited
Company’s Philosophy on Corporate Governance
Corporate Governance is the application of the best management practices to achieve the
Company’s objectives of enhancing the shareholders value and discharging social
responsibility by complying applicable laws and adherence to ethical standards.
The company has a prime responsibility to achieve transparency and equity in all aspect
of the operations by following fair and ethical practice towards all the stakeholders of the
Company. The Company believes in maintaining a simple and transparent corporate
structure driven solely by business needs and is committed to achieve good standards of
Corporate Governance on continuous basis.
Board of Directors
The Board of Directors comprises 10 Directors with a Non-Executive Chairman. There
are 8 Non-Executive Directors out of 10 directors and of which 6 are Independent
Directors. The Board’s composition is in conformity with the Clause 49 of the Listing
Agreement entered into with the Stock Exchanges.
The Independent Directors of the Company are experienced, competent and renowned
persons from their respective field. The Independent Directors take active part at the
Board and Committee meetings which adds value in the decision making process.
The names and categories of Directors of the Company, their attendance at Board
Meetings & last Annual General Meeting held during the year and the number of
Directorships and Committee Chairmanship / Membership held by them in other
Companies as on 31st March 2009 are given below. The Directorship does not include
alternate directorship, directorship of private limited companies, Section 25 companies
and companies incorporated outside India.
Audit Committee
The Audit Committee comprises 3 Non-Executive Directors. During the year under
review, the Committee met Five times on 28th April 2008, 28th July 2008, 19th August
2008, 23rd October 2008 and 29th January 2009. The attendance of the Committee is as
under:
All 3 members Non Executive / 2 Independent + 1 promoter
The Company has adopted the Non-Mandatory Requirements and formed the
Remuneration Committee and other Committees. The Company affirms that no employee
has been denied to access to the Audit Committee. As regards the non-mandatory
requirements, the Board has taken cognizance of the same and shall consider for adopting
the same as and when necessary.
Adani Enterprise Limited
Company’s Philosophy on Corporate Governance
The company believes to conduct business in an ethical and responsible manner. Strong
corporate governance has been termed as the blood that fills the veins of corporate
entities for Fairness, Transparency and Accountability. It is a road map which guides and
directs the Board of Directors of the Company to govern the affairs of the Company in a
manner most beneficial to all its stakeholders.
Adani Enterprises Ltd. (AEL) being a flagship Company of Adani Group is committed to
the adoption of best Corporate Governance Practices and their adherence in the true
spirit, at all times. The core values that drive Company's business are (i) Accountability:
Towards stakeholders and society for companies’ acts and decisions. (ii) Excellence:
Strive relentlessly and constantly improve in offerings. (iii) Legacy: Strong legacy and
roots of stringent corporate governance principles that strives to conduct business fairly,
with honesty and transparency.
The Company perceives good corporate governance practices as a key to sustainable
corporate growth and long term shareholder value creation. The primary objective is to
develop and adhere to a corporate culture of harmonious and transparent functioning. All
actions and strategic plans of Company are directed towards delivering the value to all
stakeholders, as well as conform to the highest standards of corporate behavior.
Company's philosophy on corporate governance envisages the alignment of the highest
levels of transparency, accountability and equity in all facts of its operations and in all its
interactions with its stakeholders. The company strongly believes that principles of
Fairness, Transparency and Accountability are the cornerstones for good corporate
governance. Hence, Corporate Governance to AEL means not only compliance with the
provisions of Company law, allied acts and listing agreement but also management's
responsibility to work with morality, ethics and accountability towards stakeholders and
society for their acts and decisions.
Board of Directors
As on date the Board of Directors of Company comprises of eight Directors of which six
Directors (75% of the total board strength) are Non Executive. Of these six Non
Executive Directors, five (63% of the total board strength) are Independent Directors.
Hence, the composition of the Board is in conformity with the provisions of the
Corporate Governance Code of the Listing Agreement.
Board Procedure
The company has a well-defined process of placing vital and sufficient information
before the Board pertaining to the matters to be considered at each Board and Committee
meetings, to enable the Board to discharge its responsibilities effectively.
The Company Secretary in consultation with the concerned person in the senior
management finalizes the agenda, which is distributed to the Board members in advance
before the meetings. The required information as enumerated in Annexure 1A to Clause
49 of the Listing Agreement is made available to the Board of Directors for discussions
and consideration at Board Meetings. The Board reviews the declarations made by the
Managing Director regarding compliance with all applicable laws on a quarterly basis, as
also the Board Minutes of all its subsidiary companies.
Audit Committee
Audit Committee consists of three Non Executive and Independent Directors as, all 3
Non-Executive Independent.
Cadila Healthcare Limited
Company’s Philosophy on Corporate Governance
Cadila Healthcare Limited believes in continuous good corporate governance and always
strives to improve performance at all levels by adhering to corporate governance
practices, such as managing its affairs with diligence, transparency, responsibility and
accountability, therefore, designed systems and action plans to enhance performance and
stakeholders’ value in the long run. To create a culture of good governance, Company has
adopted practices that comprise of performance accountability, effective management
control, constitution of Board Committees as a part of the internal control system, fair
representation of professionally qualified, non-executive and independent Directors on
the Board, adequate and timely compliance, disclosure of information on performance,
ownership and governance of the Company and discharge of statutory dues.
The Executive Committee comprising the Managing Director, Deputy Managing
Director, Executive Director (functional), the Chief Financial Officer and the various
business heads manage the day-to-day business affairs of the Company. The Board of
Directors monitors the overall business operations based on updates of the Company’s
performance provided by the Managing Director on a regular basis.
Composition of the Board:
The Composition of the Board of Directors, with reference to the number of Executive
and Non-Executive Directors, meets the requirement of the Code of Corporate
Governance. The Board is headed by the Executive Chairman, Mr. Pankaj R. Patel, who
is also the promoter Director. As on 31st March 2009, Company’s Board comprised
seven Directors; which include two Managing Directors and five Non-Executive
Directors who have considerable experience in their respective fields. Except Mr. Pankaj
R. Patel and Dr. Sharvil P. Patel, al l other Directors are independent Director s in terms
of Sub clause-I (A) (iii) of Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement. Independent Directors
have expert knowledge in the fields of finance, taxation, legal and industry, thus the
Board represents a balanced mix of professionals, their knowledge and expertise.
Audit Committee:
As on 31st March 2009, the Audit Committee comprised of four Independent Directors.
All 4 Non-executive/independent
Arvind Mills Limited
Company’s Philosophy on Code of Governance
The Company’s philosophy on Corporate Governance is to attain the highest levels of
transparency, accountability and integrity. This objective extends, not merely to meet
with statutory requirements but also to go beyond them by putting into place procedures
and systems which are in accordance with best practices for governance. Corporate
Governance at Arvind means being responsive to aspirations of all the stakeholders;
customers, suppliers, lenders, employees, the shareholders and expectations of the
society. The Board of Directors supports the broad principles of Corporate Governance
and lays strong emphasis on its trusteeship role to align and direct the actions of the
organization to achieve its avowed objectives of transparency, accountability and
integrity.
Board of Directors
Board has 7 directors, 2 Executive director (MD + CFO), 5 Non-Executive directors
Audit Committee
The Audit Committee of the Company comprises of 3 members, all of whom are Non-
Executive Independent Directors. Mr. Tarun Sheth, an Independent Director acts as
Chairman of the Committee. The Committee members are professionals having requisite
experience in the field of Finance, Accounting and Banking
Suzlon Energy Limited
Company's Philosophy on Corporate Governance
The Company's corporate governance philosophy rests on the pillars of integrity,
accountability, equity, transparency and environmental responsibility that conform fully
with laws, regulations and guidelines. Keeping this in mind, the Company's vision is to
leverage opportunities towards powering a greener tomorrow with inclusive growth and
ethical business practices. The Company has always set high targets for the growth,
profitability, customer satisfaction, safety and environmental performance and continues
its commitment to high standards of corporate governance practices. To the Company,
corporate governance means living its corporate values with the goal of having a minimal
impact on the environment, enabling local communities to develop their potential,
empowering employees to be responsible civil society members and committing itself to
business practices that are fair to all stakeholders so that it can collectively contribute
towards creating a better and greener world for all.
Board of Directors
The Company has a balanced mix of executive and non-executive independent directors.
The Board consists of six directors as on March 31, 2009, out of which two are executive
directors and four are non-executive independent directors. The chairman of the Board is
an executive director and more than half of the Board is independent. The composition of
the Board is in compliance with the requirements of Clause 49(I)(A) of the listing
agreement with the stock exchanges. All the directors have certified that they are not
members of more than ten mandatory committees in terms of the listing agreement and
do not act as chairman of more than five mandatory committees in terms of the listing
agreement across all companies in which they are directors.
Board Procedure
Board members are provided appropriate documents and information under Annexure IA
to Clause 49 pertaining to the matters to be considered at each board and committee
meetings, to enable the Board to discharge its responsibilities effectively and the
chairman and managing director reviews the overall performance of the Company.
Audit committee
The Audit Committee of the Company has been constituted as per the requirements of
Clause 49 of the listing agreement. The composition of audit committee is in compliance
with the requirements of Clause 49(II)(A) of the listing agreement. It consists of three
members, all of whom including the Chairman are independent directors
Financial results for 2008-09
Company Promoter
share %
Sale
(Million
INR)
Profit
(Million
INR)
Share
capital
(Million
INR)
Reserve
(Million
INR)
Share
price*
(INR)
Share
Face
value
(INR)
Nirma
Limited
77.17 33540 1183 795 25214 189 5
Cadila 74.72 20051 2964 682 11646 652 5
Torrent
Pharma
74.09 11482 1911 423 6903 561 5
Adani
Enterprise
74.91 115750 3746 246 16184 534 1
Arvind Mills 35.42 22977 (469) 2601 9404 34 10
Suzlon
Energy
53.27 260820 2360 2996 61774 58 2
Nandan 49.67 2228 131.71 303 349 2 1
*As on 9th July 2010
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Annexure – I
Legal Framework for Corporate Governance in India
The
Legislation
Provision Penalty
The
Constitution
Law of India
Article 38 & 39, The government is
directed that the ownership & control of
the material resources are so distributed as
to conform to the common good &
operation of the economic system does
not result into concentration of wealth &
means of production to the common
detriment
It is source of legislation to
enact rules to conform
directions given by
constitution and by such
rules, if fundamental right of
a person is violated, courts
give priority for common
interest
Companies
Act, 1956
Sec. 59, If any prospectus is issued in
contravention of section 57 or 58, the
company, and every person, who is
knowingly a party to the issue thereof,
shall be punishable with fine which may
extend to fifty thousand rupees
Punishable with
imprisonment for a term
which may extend to five
years, or with fine which
may extend to one hundred
thousand rupees or with both
Sec. 63, Criminal liability for
misstatements in prospectus, Where a
prospectus issued includes any untrue
statement, every person who authorized
the issue of the prospectus
Punishable with
imprisonment for a term
which may extend to one/two
year, or with fine, or with
both
Sec.68, Penalty for fraudulently inducing
persons to invest money
Sec. 105, Penalty for concealing name of
creditor
Sec. 162 provides penalty for
contravention of not filing annual return
& statement as prescribed
Punishable with fine which
may extend to five hundred
rupees for every day during
which the default continues
Sec. 211 (3A) Every profit and loss
account and balance sheet of the company
shall comply with the accounting
standards.
(3B) Where the profit and loss account
and the balance sheet of the company do
not comply with the accounting standards,
such companies shall disclose in its profit
and loss account and balance sheet, (a) the
deviation from the accounting standards;
(b) the reasons for such deviation; and
(c) the financial effect, if any, arising due
to such deviation.
The statutory auditors are
required to make
qualification in their report in
case any item is treated
differently from the
prescribed Accounting
Standard. In addition to this
Section 227(3)(d) of
Companies
Act, 1956 requires an auditor
Section 217 sub section (2AA) the
Companies Amendment Act, 2000 states
that The Board's report shall also include
Directors' Responsibility Statement
indicating therein that in preparation of
annual accounts, the applicable
accounting standards had been followed
along with proper explanation relating to
material departure
to report whether, in his
opinion, the profit and loss
account and balance sheet
are complied with the
accounting standards referred
to in Section 211(3C) of
Companies Act, 1956.
Sec. 225 deals with Statutory Audit of a
company, company require to take
certificate of auditor that certify financial
statement as true & fair
Auditor ensures financial statement is the
result of financial transaction recorded
and reported as per GAAP
Sec. 232 provides penalty for not
complying with preparing, presenting,
submitting/filing audit report as
prescribed u/S 225-231
The company, and every
officer of the company who
is in default, shall be
punishable with fine which
may extend to five thousand
rupees
Sec. 279 prescribe penalty for holding
directorship in more number of companies
than prescribed
Sec. 297 prescribe taking sanction of the
Board of company if a director has
interest in certain contract with the
company
Section 299 of the Act requires every
director of a company to make disclosure,
at the Board meeting, of the nature of his
concern or interest in a contract or
arrangement (present or proposed) entered
by or on behalf of the company.  The
company is also required to record such
transactions in the Register of Contract
under section 301 of the Act.
For each additional company
in which he is director, INR
50000
Sec 299 provide accountability of a
director to disclose his interest in the
contract with the company. Sec. 300 states
that the interested director can not
participate or vote in Board's proceedings
Interested director can not
participate in the voting in
Board meeting for the
purpose
Sec. 371 prescribes penalty for
contravention of section 369 (Loans to
managing agent), 370 (Loans, etc., to
companies under the same management)
or 370A, pertaining to intra-company loan
Shall be punishable with fine
which may extend to fifty
thousand rupees or with
simple imprisonment for a
or borrowing or creating liabilities like
guarantee etc.
Sec. 372 prescribes restriction on
purchase of share etc. of any company by
putting limits
term which may extend to
six months
Sec. 628, 629 prescribes penalty for false
statements or false evidences
Punishable for imprisonment
which may extend to 2 to 7
years, and shall also be liable
to fine.
Security
Contract Act,
1956
Contracts of security trade in designated
area, time, licensing, to deal with
recognized dealer, through stock exchange
etc. Contract otherwise than this may be
void
Punishable with
imprisonment for a term
which may extend to one
year, or with fine, or with
both, authority is empowered
to de-list a company
SEBI: Listing
Agreement,
Clause 49
Composition of Board (at least half should
be non-executive, independent), Non
executive directors’ compensation and
disclosures, board meetings (minimum 4
in a year), ceiling on director’s
membership in committees (maximum
10), ceiling chairman of committees
(maximum 5), Audit Committee chairman
should be independent director, 2/3rd
members should independent & finance or
accounting expert, applicability of code of
conduct over Board members & top
management, appointment of independent
director as director of a subsidiary
company, procedure to assess risks &
disclosures thereof, CEO & CFO
certification of financial statement, report
on corporate governance compliance
Company may be de-listed
from stock exchange
SEBI:
Takeover &
Insider
Trading,
Shareholder
Protection
etc.
Four prone control/ penal provisions:
Directions in investor interest,
Adjudication Proceedings, Criminal
Prosecution, Enquiry Proceedings
Any person who, directly or indirectly,
acquires or agrees to acquire shares or
voting rights in the target company, or
acquires or agrees to acquire control over
the target company, either by himself or
with any person acting in concert with the
acquirer shall inform on crossing 5% or
10% or 14%, 54% and 74% inform Target
Company and Stock Exchange within 2
Penalty of INR 100,000 per
day of continuing violation,
penalty is 3 to 5 time of
undue gain or advantage,
Violation may leads to freeze
of transfer of share, voting
rights, debarring from access
to capital markets, forefeet
escrow money,
imprisonment up to 10 years
and penalty of INR 2.5
million in criminal offenses
days, Persons holding between 15% &
55%, to disclose purchase or sales
aggregating to 2% or more, within 2 days
to target company and the stock
exchanges, open offer to purchase at least
20% of share at same price if holding
cross 15%. Ban on using inside
information for personal gain by way of
purchase or sale securities for those who
have access of internal information
Indian Penal
Code
Sec. 120B (Criminal conspiracy) 406,
409, 420, 468, 471, 477A relating to
fraud, cheating public, creating false
documents, duping money etc.
Imprisonment up to 10 years
Income Tax
Act 1961
Regulations (2002) contained the
mechanism to ensure that income arising
out of international transactions between
related parties (associated enterprises) is
computed on the basis of arm’s length.
Authorizes the assessing of
officer to refer the process of
determination of arm’s
length price to the transfer
pricing officer amounts to
reassessment
Financial Performance Analysis (Million INR)
Non Mandatory Requirements:
Adani Enterprise
Company
Over
all
Rank
Profit
Rank
ROI
Rank
ROIE
Rank
Promoter
Share %
Sale Profit Equity Reserve Market
Value
Face
Value
Profit % ROI ROIE Ave
Rage
Torrent
Pharma 1 1 2 1 74.09 11482 1911 423 6903 561 5 16.64 451.773 26.1 1.333
Cadila
Health
Care 2 2 3 2 74.72 20051 2964 682 11646 652 5 14.78 434.604 24 2.333
Adani
Enterprise
3 5 1 3 74.91 115750 3746 246 16184 534 1 3.236 1522.76 22.8 3
Nandan
Exim
4 3 6 4 49.67 2228 131.7 303 349 2 1 5.912 43.4686 20.2 4.333
Nirma
Limited
4 4 4 5 77.17 33540 1183 795 25214 189 5 3.527 148.805 4.55 4.333
Suzlon
Energy
6 6 5 6 53.27 260820 2360 2996 61774 58 2 0.905 78.7717 3.64 5.667
Arvind
Mills 7 7 7 7 35.42 22977 -469 2601 9404 34 10 -2.04 -18.032 -3.91 7
The non mandatory requirements have been adopted to the extent and in the manner as
stated under the appropriate headings detailed below:
Company has an Executive Chairman and hence, the need for implementing this non
mandatory requirement has not arisen.
Company has a Remuneration Committee to recommend appointment / re-appointment
and to recommend/ review remuneration of the Executive Chairman / Managing / Whole
time Directors.
The quarterly / half quarterly results of Company after being subjected to a Limited
Review by the Statutory Auditors are published in newspapers and posted on Company's
website. The same are also available at the sites of the stock exchanges where the shares
of the Company are listed i.e. www.bseindia.com and www.nseindia.com
The provisions relating to Postal Ballot has been complied with in respect of matters
where applicable.
Company adopts best practices to ensure the regime of unqualified financial statements.
Statutory Auditors have issued an unqualified opinion on the statutory financial
statements of Company.
The employees of Company are accessible to the senior management for any counseling
or consultation and Company has not denied any employee access to the audit committee.
All the Non-Executive Directors have rich experience and expertise in their functional
areas. During Audit and Board Meetings, the management and working Directors give
extensive briefings to the Board Members on the business of Company.
Nirma Limited
The Company has adopted the Non-Mandatory Requirements and formed the
Remuneration Committee and other Committees. The Company affirms that no employee
has been denied to access to the Audit Committee. As regards the non-mandatory
requirements, the Board has taken cognizance of the same and shall consider for adopting
the same as and when necessary.
Suzlon Energy
Besides mandatory requirements, the Company has voluntarily constituted a
Remuneration Committee to consider and recommend the remuneration of the directors
and approval and administration of the employee stock option plans (ESOPs).
The Company does not have a formal whistle blower policy; however, the Company has
its intranet portal, wherein all the employees are free to express their
feedback/suggestions/complaints, if any. The same is further supported by surveys of
employees conducted by independent global agencies.
The quarterly/annual results and notices as required under Clause 41 of the listing
agreement are normally published in the 'The Economic Times'/'Business Standard'/'The
Financial Express' (English & Gujarati editions).
The annual/quarterly results of the Company, shareholding pattern, the official news
releases and the presentations made by the Company to analysts and institutional
investors are posted on its website www.suzlon.com. Quarterly results and shareholding
pattern are also displayed on EDIFAR facility of Securities and Exchange Board of India
(SEBI) website www.sebiedifar.nic.in for the benefit of public at large.
Details of unclaimed shares in terms of Clause 5A of listing agreement As per terms of
newly inserted Clause 5A of the Listing Agreement, the Company is in process of
crediting the shares allotted pursuant to the Initial Public Offering (IPO) of the Company
completed in year 2005 which are unclaimed and are lying in escrow account to a demat
suspense account and the details as required to be disclosed in the Annual Report.
